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Abstract. We seek to understand the fundamental mathematics gov-
erning infrastructure-scale interactions between humans and machines,
particularly when the machines intended purpose is to influence and op-
timize the behavior of the humans. To that end, this paper investigates
the worst-case congestion that can arise in nonatomic network conges-
tion games when a fraction of the traffic is completely altruistic (e.g.,
benevolent self-driving cars) and the remainder is completely selfish (e.g.,
human commuters). We study the worst-case harm of altruism in such
scenarios in terms of the perversity index, or the worst-case equilibrium
congestion cost resulting from the presence of altruistic traffic, relative
to the congestion cost which would result if all traffic were selfish. We
derive a tight bound on the perversity index for the class of series-parallel
network congestion games with convex latency functions, and show three
facts: First, the harm of altruism is maximized when exactly half of the
traffic is altruistic, but it gracefully vanishes when the fraction of altru-
istic traffic approaches either 0 or 1. Second, we show that the harm of
altruism is linearly increasing in a natural measure of the “steepness”
of network latency functions. Finally, we show that for any nontrivial
fraction of altruistic traffic, the harm of altruism exceeds the price of
anarchy associated with all-selfish traffic: in a sense, partial altruism is
worse than complete selfishness.
Keywords: Selfish Routing · Altruism · Transportation Networks.
1 Introduction
As technology becomes ever-more integrated with society, it becomes increas-
ingly urgent to understand and optimize the relationship between human social
behavior and the technical performance of infrastructure systems [17]. An im-
portant test case for this is the problem of routing in transportation networks; it
is well-known that if individuals select routes across a city to minimize their own
transit delay, this can easily lead to suboptimal traffic congestion [20]. A popular
model of such systems is the nonatomic network congestion game, which mod-
els traffic as a continuum of infinitely-many infinitesimally-small self-interested
agents. Much research on nonatomic congestion games has investigated how
? This work was supported by NSF Grant #ECCS-2013779.
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2 P. N. Brown
to mitigate the inefficiencies resulting from self-interested behavior, with ap-
proaches including monetary incentives [8], centralized routing schemes [19], and
information provision [6]. Another active line of research has sought to under-
stand how perceptual biases in users’ costs might affect the quality of the result-
ing aggregate behavior [5,10,13,15,22,9] (we provide more detail in Section 2.4).
In this paper, inspired by the potential afforded by emerging paradigms such
as the Internet of Things, we ask the following question: suppose a planner were
able to design the behaviors of some group of system users (perhaps a group of
self-driving cars). How should those users be designed to behave? Specifically,
what cost functions should be applied to guide those users’ routing choices?
While many potential cost functions are possible, this paper initiates a study
on the impact of endowing a subset of users with altruistic cost functions, or
ones which lead each user to consider the effects of her actions on those around
her. The key motivation for our study on altruism is this: if a planner could
design all user cost functions, then altruistic cost functions would in some sense
be the unique best choice as they induce optimal Nash equilibria in nonatomic
congestion games irrespective of network topology.
Accordingly, the model of heterogeneous altruism proposed in [5] is of special
relevance to our paper. In this model, users are diverse in their altruism, each
potentially weighing her impact on others in an individual way. In our context,
the central result of [5] is that on simple networks (specifically parallel networks
on which all users have access to all paths), altruism behaves “as intended” –
that is, increasing the fraction of users that are altruistic always improves worst-
case equilibrium congestion. Unfortunately, recent work has highlighted the fact
that if transportation networks are sufficiently complex, heterogeneous altruism
need not lead to improvements in aggregate behavior; put differently, altruism
can be perverse on some networks [3,4,22].
Thus, to understand when and if artificial altruism can be used to improve
routing performance, it is imperative that its potential negative effects be fully
characterized. In this paper, for the class of series-parallel networks with convex
cost functions, we investigate the quality of equilibria resulting when a fraction
rs ∈ [0, 1] of traffic is fully selfish and the remainder is fully altruistic. We as-
sess the potential harm of partial altruism by a metric known as the perversity
index, defined as the ratio between the equilibrium congestion costs of a het-
erogeneous population and a fully-selfish population, taken in worst-case over a
class of games. That is, if the perversity index is 1, partial altruism never in-
duces equilibria that are worse than their fully-selfish counterparts; on the other
hand, if the perversity index is large, partial altruism can substantially degrade
equilibria relative to fully-selfish equilibria. We prove the following in Theorem 1
and its Corollary 1:
1. For all classes of latency functions, the worst-case perversity index (i.e.,
harm of altruism) occurs when rs = 1/2; that is, when there is an even split
between altruistic and selfish traffic.
2. We provide an expression for the perversity index that is increasing, linear,
and unbounded in the “steepness” of a network’s latency functions (for poly-
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nomial latency functions, the steepness is essentially the maximum degree;
note however that our result holds for any convex latency function).
3. Our bounds are tight for all rs, and all of our worst-case instances are 3-link
parallel networks.
Figure 1 plots our bounds for polynomial latency functions of degree p ∈ {1, . . . , 4};
note that for each of these, the maximum perversity index is 1 + p/2, and de-
grades gracefully to 1 as rs → 0 and rs → 1. Finally, note that for each p, the
maximum harm of partial altruism is actually greater than the price of anarchy.1
In particular note that for linear-affine latency functions (p = 1), the perversity
index can be as high as 1.5, exceeding the well-known price of anarchy bound of
4/3 for the same class of games. Our Corollary 2 shows that this is ubiquitous:
for any rs ∈ (0, 1), there exists a choice of cost functions (possibly very steep)
such that partial altruism causes more harm than selfishness in worst case.
Fig. 1. Perversity index with respect to selfish fraction rs, plotted for polynomial la-
tency functions of degree p ∈ {1, . . . , 4} (see Theorem 1 and Corollary 1).
2 Model and Related Work
2.1 Routing Problem
Consider a network routing problem for a network (V,E) comprised of vertex
set V and edge set E. There is a unit mass of traffic that needs to be routed
from a common source s to a common destination t. In this work we consider
that traffic is composed of two types, which we term selfish and altruistic, with
masses rs and ra, respectively, with ra + rs = 1. We write P ⊆ 2E to denote
the set of paths available to traffic, where each path p ∈ P consists of a set of
edges connecting s to t. The selfish (resp., altruistic) traffic can access path set
Ps (resp., Pa), where Ps and Pa are arbitrary subsets of P. We say that a graph
is series-parallel if it is any of
1. a single edge,
1 The price of anarchy is the worst-case ratio between the fully-selfish equilibria and
the optimal allocation [20].
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2. two series-parallel graphs connected in series, or
3. two series-parallel graphs connected in parallel.
For each type y ∈ {a, s}, we write xyp ≥ 0 to denote the mass of traffic of type
y using path p ∈ Py. A feasible flow for type y is written xy ∈ R|Py|≥0 , and is an
assignment of ry units of traffic to paths in Py such that∑p∈P xyp = ry. A feasible
flow x ∈ R|P|≥0 is an assignment of traffic to paths such that xp :=
∑
y:p∈Py x
y
p,
where the corresponding flows xy are each feasible for their corresponding types.
Given a flow x, the flow on edge e is given by xe =
∑
p:e∈p xp. As before,
we may denote the flow of type y ∈ {a, s} on edge e by xye . To characterize
transit delay as a function of traffic flow, each edge e ∈ E is associated with
a specific latency function `e : [0, 1] → [0,∞), where `e(xe) denotes the delay
experienced by users of edge e when the edge flow is xe. We adopt the standard
assumptions that each latency function is nondecreasing, convex, and continu-
ously differentiable. We measure the cost of a flow x by the total latency, given
by
L(x) =
∑
e∈E
xe`e(xe) =
∑
p∈P
xp`p(x), (1)
where `p(x) :=
∑
e∈p `e(xe) denotes the latency on path p given flow x.
Given edge latency function `e(xe), the marginal cost function associated
with `e is denoted `
mc
e and is given by
`mce (xe) = `e(xe) + xe`
′
e(xe), (2)
where `′ denotes the flow derivative of `. A routing problem is fully speci-
fied by G = (V,E, {`e} ,Pa,Ps, rs). We write G(γ) to denote the set of all
nonatomic congestion games on series-parallel networks having latency func-
tions with marginal-cost ratio bounded by γ; that is, for every G ∈ G(γ) and
every `e ∈ G, `mce (xe) ≤ γ`e(xe) for all xe ∈ [0, 1].
2.2 Heterogeneous Routing Game
To understand the potential negative effects of uncoordinated heterogeneous
altruistic behavior, we model the above routing problem as a non-atomic con-
gestion game. We consider each type of traffic to be composed of infinitely-many
infinitesimal users, and the cost function of each user is determined by its type.
Given a flow x, the cost that a selfish-type user experiences for using path p ∈ Ps
is simply the latency of the path:
J sp(x) :=
∑
e∈p
`e(xe). (3)
The cost that an altruistic-type user experiences for using path p ∈ Pa is the
marginal cost of the path:
Jap (x) = `
mc
p (x) :=
∑
e∈p
[`e(xe) + xe`
′
e(xe)] . (4)
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Prior literature justifies this formulation as an appropriate cost function for
altruistic users; we refer readers to [5] for a detailed exposition. Informally, note
that an altruistic user’s link cost is the sum of two components: first, the latency
of the link; second, the user’s marginal effect on other users of the link – an
altruistic user fully accounts for the negative congestion externalities she imposes
on others. In addition, these altruistic cost functions are fundamental in the
literature on taxation for behavior influence in congestion games [4].
We assume that each user selects the lowest-cost path from the available
source-destination paths. We call a flow f a Nash flow if all users are individually
using minimum-cost paths given the choices of other users. That is, the following
condition is satisfied for each type y ∈ {a, s}:
∀p, p′ ∈ Py, xyp > 0 =⇒ Jyp (x) ≤ Jyp′(x). (5)
It is well-known that a Nash flow exists for any non-atomic congestion game of
the above form [12]. Note that a Nash flow must satisfy the well-known Wardrop
condition that for each type y ∈ {a, s}, all used paths have equal cost [23]:
∀p, p′ ∈ Py, xyp > 0 and xyp′ > 0 =⇒ Jyp (x) = Jyp′(x). (6)
This paper frequently considers the effect of “converting” all altruistic traffic
to selfish traffic. To that end, given routing problem G, we write G¯ to denote
the homogenized version of G in which all traffic behaves selfishly. The homoge-
nized G¯ is identical to G except that the altruistic traffic adopts the selfish cost
function (3); all path sets, latency functions, traffic rates, and network topology
remain the same. When x is a Nash flow for G, we often write x¯ to denote a
Nash flow for G¯.
2.3 Performance Metrics: Price of Anarchy and Perversity Index
For ease of notation, we write Lnf(G, rs) to denote the total latency of a worst-
case heterogeneous Nash flow for routing problem G and selfish fraction rs (with
corresponding altruistic fraction ra = 1−rs). Let Lnf (G¯) denote the total latency
of a Nash flow on homogenized routing problem G¯. Let L∗(G) denote the total
latency of an optimal flow on G (note that L∗(G) has no dependency on rs,
since it considers only the time cost of flows). In our context, we define the price
of anarchy of a class of games G with selfish fraction rs as the worst-case ratio
of the cost of a heterogeneous Nash flow with that of an optimal flow, formally
written
PoA (G, rs) , sup
G∈G
Lnf(G, rs)
L∗(G) . (7)
Note that when rs = 1 (i.e., all traffic is selfish), (7) coincides with the standard
definition of price of anarchy [20]. At the other extreme, when rs = 0 (i.e., all
traffic is altruistic), it is well-known that PoA (G, 0) = 1; that is, homogeneous
altruistic Nash flows are always optimal [5].
In this paper, we study a related metric known as the perversity index which
aptly captures the worst-case effects of heterogeneous altruism; this metric was
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originally proposed to study the risks associated with marginal-cost taxation [4].
The perversity index captures the harm that altruism causes relative to selfish-
ness; it is thus similar in many respects to the deviation ratio of [10] and the
price of risk aversion of [16]. This is a natural modification of the price of anarchy
concept obtained by replacing the optimal total latency with the all-selfish total
latency Lnf(G¯):
PI (G, rs) , sup
G∈G
Lnf(G, rs)
Lnf (G¯) . (8)
Here, if G has a large perversity index, this means that networks exist in
G for which heterogeneous (partially-altruistic) Nash flows can be considerably
worse than corresponding homogeneous all-selfish Nash flows. Note that for any
G, it holds that PI(G, 0) = 1, since rs = 0 leads to optimal flows (and some
optimal flows are also homogeneous selfish Nash flows); it also trivially holds that
PI(G, 1) = 1. Furthermore, the perversity index is upper-bounded by the price
of anarchy: PI(G, rs) ≤ PoA(G, rs); this is because on any G, Lnf(G¯) ≥ L∗(G).
2.4 Related Work
Altruism and Biased Costs in Congestion Games. The effects of altruism
in nonatomic congestion games are investigated in detail in [5], where it is shown
that in parallel networks (i.e., 2-node networks) in which all users can access all
paths (in our model, Pa = Ps = P), the price of anarchy due to heterogeneous
altruism is always less than the price of anarchy for homogeneous selfish popula-
tions. This was extended by [3] which showed that on the same class of networks,
the perversity index due to heterogeneous altruism is unity; that is, not only is
altruism helpful in worst-case, it is also helpful on every network. It was also
shown in [3] that more complex non-parallel networks exist which do not possess
this property, even when Pa = Ps = P; on these pathological networks altruism
can cause harm relative to corresponding all-selfish flows. However, the question
of how much harm has remained an open question.
Our work is tightly connected with the broader theme of “biased” congestion
games, where players misinterpret edge cost functions in some systematic way.
Several works have investigated the price of anarchy under various payoff biases
such as pessimism [13], risk-aversion [15], and uncertainty [22]. Analogous to
our definition of the perversity index, the authors of [11] study the “price of risk
aversion,” which measures how society’s risk preferences affect aggregate conges-
tion as compared to ordinary Nash flows. Similarly, [10] studies the “deviation
ratio,” which measures essentially the same quantity for arbitrary cost function
biases. However, as we discuss in our technical results, the bounds given by [10]
do not apply to a significant portion of the parameter space required to analyze
the perversity index of altruistic populations.
Marginal-Cost Pricing in Congestion Games. A great deal of work has
focused on improving the price of anarchy through the use of marginal-cost
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pricing, a road tolling scheme which charges users of each edge e a price of
τmce (xe) = xe`
′
e(xe), (9)
with the aim of internalizing each user’s congestion externality. Marginal-cost
pricing intends to induce an artificial altruism in users’ costs, and it has long
been known that if all users have a known unit price-sensitivity (i.e., all trade
off time and money equally), marginal-cost pricing leads to optimal Nash flows
irrespective of network topology [1,21]. However, these optimality guarantees
vanish in the presence of user heterogeneity; in the extreme case when some users
ignore tolls, it is known that marginal-cost pricing is perverse and can induce
Nash flows that are considerably worse than the corresponding uninfluenced
selfish flows [4]. Thus, the present paper’s results regarding the harm caused by
heterogeneous altruistic users immediately imply corresponding results regarding
the potential harm caused by imperfect marginal-cost pricing.
Stackelberg Routing. One of the goals of the present paper is to understand
how socially-networked autonomous agents (such as self-driving cars) should be
designed to optimally interact with and influence human agents. In light of this,
it is important to mention the related notion of Stackelberg routing. In a Stack-
elberg routing scenario, a system planner has complete routing control over some
fraction of network traffic, and the question is how to route this traffic in such
a way that when the remaining traffic routes selfishly, the resulting congestion
cost is minimized. A variety of results exist in this framework, including positive
results for simple networks [19] and negative results for complex networks [2].
3 Contribution: Altruists Cause Bounded Harm
One might hope that increasing the fraction of altruists in a routing game would
result in improvements in the quality of resulting Nash flows in a similar way that
it does in parallel networks [4]; unfortunately, in this paper we show that this
need not be the case. Nonetheless, for classes of routing games with a bounded
marginal-cost ratio, we also show that the harm resulting from heterogeneous
altruism is bounded and achieves its worst-case when rs = 1/2. Our main result,
capturing these two facts, is given as the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let G(γ) be the class of series-parallel nonatomic congestion games
with cost functions having maximum marginal-cost ratio γ ≥ 1, and let rs ∈ [0, 1]
be the fraction of selfish traffic. Then
PI (G(γ), rs) =
{
1 + rs(γ − 1) if rs ≤ 1/2
γ − rs(γ − 1) if rs > 1/2. (10)
In particular, it always holds that
PI(G(γ, rs)) ≤ PI(G(γ, 1/2)) = 1 + γ
2
. (11)
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The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in detail in Section 4; before its pre-
sentation, we note here several salient details and discuss the consequences of
the result. First, the functional form of the perversity index in (10) is strikingly
simple, being linear in γ and piecewise-linear in rs. For any γ, its maximum is
attained at rs = 1/2: that is, worst-case outcomes occur for equal parts selfish
and altruistic traffic irrespective of the functional form of cost functions. As we
show in Lemma 3, the bound is tight for any fixed γ and rs, in the sense that
given γ ≥ 1 and rs ∈ [0, 1], there exists a choice of latency function ` satisfying
`mc ≤ γ` which can be used to construct networks which achieve the bound.
A intuitive and commonly-studied class of latency functions is the polynomial
latency functions of degree p; the following corollary grounds Theorem 1 by
deriving the perversity index associated with polynomial latency functions.
Corollary 1. Let Gp be the class of two-terminal series-parallel nonatomic con-
gestion games with polynomial cost functions of maximum degree p ≥ 1. Then
for every p ∈ N and every rs ∈ [0, 1], the following holds:
PI (G(p), rs) =
{
1 + prs if rs ≤ 1/2
1 + p(1− rs) if rs > 1/2. (12)
Proof. It suffices to show that if `(x) is a polynomial of degree p, then `mc(x) ≤
(p+1)`(x); then (12) follows directly from (10). To that end, let `(x) =
∑p
i=0 aix
i,
where ai ≥ 0 for all i. Then applying (4), we have
`mc(x) =
p∑
i=0
(
aix
i + iaix
i
)
≤
p∑
i=0
(p+ 1)aix
i
= (p+ 1)`(x).
uunionsq
Note that the expression in (12) is Θ(p) for all rs /∈ {0, 1}. This contrasts
sharply with canonical price of anarchy results for the same class of networks
which state that the all-selfish homogeneous PoA(G(p), 1) = Θ(p/ log p). In
essence, Corollary 1 indicates that in a worst-case sense, partial altruism is worse
than uniform selfishness.
We sharpen this observation in our next corollary, which demonstrates that
this phenomenon is ubiquitous:
Corollary 2. Let G(p) be the class of two-terminal series-parallel nonatomic
congestion games with polynomial cost functions of maximum degree p ≥ 1. For
any p, let r∗ be defined as
r∗ =
1
(p+ 1)
p+1
p − p
= Θ
(
1
log p
)
. (13)
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Then for every p and every rs ∈ (r∗, 1− r∗), the following holds:
PoA(G(p), rs) > PoA(G(p), 1). (14)
Proof. Here, we leverage the following well-known expression (see [18] for de-
tails):
PoA(G(p), 1) = 1
1− p(p+ 1)−(p+1)/p = Θ
(
p
log p
)
. (15)
Recall that PoA(G(p), rs) ≥ PI(G(p), rs) for all rs, and note that PI(G(p), rs) =
PI(G(p), 1 − rs). Let r∗ be the solution to 1 + pr∗ = PoA(G(p), 1); in can be
shown that this solution always occurs on the interval [0, 1/2]. Thus, due to the
functional form of (12), (14) holds for any rs ∈ (r∗, 1− r∗). uunionsq
This result is striking, since it implies that for very steep cost functions, even
a very small fraction of selfish traffic is sufficient to drive the heterogeneous price
of anarchy above the homogeneous price of anarchy, and our Lemma 3 shows
that this can be realized on very simple 3-link networks. Note that Corollary 2
is similar in spirit to a Stackelberg routing result of [2, Theorem 3.1] which
can be used to lower-bound the price of anarchy of heterogeneous Nash flows
in our context. In [2], the authors show that the price of anarchy is unbounded
for any fixed fraction rs > 0 of selfish traffic. However, that paper left open an
important question: is the price of anarchy with heterogeneous traffic at least
improved relative to the all-selfish price of anarchy? Corollary 2 answers this
open question negatively: if we place no restriction on allowable cost functions,
then for every rs ∈ (0, 1), the price of anarchy is (1) unbounded, and (2) greater
than if all traffic were selfish.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
4.1 Overview
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed in three steps, each with an associated
lemma.
1. First, Lemma 1 derives an upper bound on the perversity index for the case
that rs ≤ 1/2.
2. Second, Lemma 2 derives an upper bound on the perversity index for the
case that rs > 1/2. We note that Lemma 2 is also a consequence of [10,
Theorem 1], but we state it in terms of our specific model and provide a
proof that is highly simplified relative to that of [10].
3. Finally, Lemma 3 provides a family of problem instances which exhibit a
matching lower bound for Lemmas 1 and 2, completing the proof.
We state the lemmas here and then proceed with their proofs in subsequent
subsections.
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Lemma 1. Let G be a series-parallel nonatomic congestion game with selfish
fraction rs ∈ [0, 1] and maximum marginal-cost ratio γ. If x is a heterogeneous
Nash flow for G and x¯ is an all-selfish Nash flow for G¯, the following holds:
L(x) ≤ ((1− rs) + rsγ)L(x¯). (16)
Lemma 1 exhibits the intuitive feature that if a very small fraction of traffic
is selfish (i.e., rs is very close to 0), this small amount of selfish traffic can cause
very little harm. In the limit as rs → 0, this resolves to the well-known fact
that if rs = 0, then L(x) ≤ L(x¯) (since a homogeneous altruistic Nash flow is
optimal). However, the bound in (16) is demonstrably loose for large rs (e.g.,
ra = 0), since it resolves to the trivially loose bound of L(x) ≤ γL(x¯) where
both x and x¯ are all-selfish Nash flows.2 Fortunately, the following Lemma 2
addresses the case of large rs and offers a degree of symmetry with respect to
the bound in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Let G be a series-parallel nonatomic congestion game with selfish
fraction rs ∈ [0, 1] and maximum marginal-cost ratio γ. If x is a heterogeneous
Nash flow for G and x¯ is an all-selfish Nash flow for G¯, the following holds:
L(x) ≤ (rs + (1− rs)γ)L(x¯). (17)
Much like before, Lemma 2 illustrates the intuitive feature that if a very
large fraction of traffic is selfish (i.e., rs is very close to 1), the overall Nash flow
behaves very much like a homogeneous selfish Nash flow. Our final lemma shows
that these bounds are tight by constructing a family of networks which achieve
the bounds.
Lemma 3. Let γ > 1 and rs ∈ [0, 1]. Then there exists a network G ∈ G(γ)
such that
Lnf(G, rs)
Lnf (G¯) ≥
{
1 + rs(γ − 1) if rs ≤ 1/2
γ − rs(γ − 1) if rs > 1/2. (18)
4.2 Proofs of Supporting Lemmas
First, note that the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 require the following technical
result. We first state the following lemma, borrowed from [22, Proposition 2] and
framed specifically in our context (this can also be deduced from [14, Lemma
2]):
Lemma 4 (Sekar et al., 2019). Let G be a series-parallel nonatomic conges-
tion game. If x is a heterogeneous Nash flow for G and x¯ is an all-selfish Nash
flow for G¯, the total cost experienced by selfish traffic in x is no higher than that
in x¯: ∑
p∈P
xsp`p(x) ≤
∑
p∈P
x¯sp`p(x¯). (19)
2 In any nonatomic congestion game satisfying our assumptions, every homogeneous
selfish Nash flow is well-known to have the same total cost [7,21].
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With this result in hand, we are ready to provide the proof of Lemma 1. In the
following proofs, when x is a Nash flow, we write Λ(x) to denote the common
latency experienced by members of the selfish type in x.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let G, x, and x¯ be as specified in the statement of Lemma 1.
The proof proceeds via a linearization argument enabled by the convexity of L.
For each edge e ∈ E, let δe := xe − x¯e, so that we have
L(x)− L(x¯) =
∑
e∈E
(xe`e(xe)− x¯e`e(x¯e))
=
∑
e∈E
((x¯e + δe)`e(x¯e + δe)− x¯e`e(x¯e))
=
∑
e∈E
δe
(
`e(x¯e + δe) +
x¯e
δe
(`e(x¯e + δe)− `e(x¯e))
)
.
≤
∑
e∈E
δe (`e(x¯e + δe) + x¯e`
′
e(x¯e + δe)) , (20)
Where (20) holds because each `e is convex and nondecreasing. Note that since
each x¯e + δe ≥ 0, (and thus δe(x¯e + δe) ≥ x¯e), we may continue the estimate as:
L(x)− L(x¯) ≤
∑
e∈E
δe (`e(x¯e + δe) + (x¯e + δe)`
′
e(x¯e + δe))
=
∑
e∈E
δe`
mc
e (x¯e + δe)
=
∑
e∈E
δe`
mc
e (xe). (21)
Define δe,p = δp if e ∈ p, and δe,p = 0 otherwise, so that (21) continues as
L(x)− L(x¯) ≤
∑
e∈E
∑
p∈P
δe,p`
mc
e (xe)
=
∑
p∈P
δp`
mc
p (x)
=
∑
p∈P
δsp`
mc
p (x) +
∑
p∈P
δap`
mc
p (x), (22)
Where for path p, let δap := x
a
p − x¯ap and δsp := xsp − x¯sp so that δp = δsp + δap. Let
p¯ := arg maxp∈Ps `
mc
p (x), let P+ := {p ∈ P : δsp ≥ 0}, and let P− := {p ∈ P :
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δsp < 0}. Then since `mcp (x) ≥ `p(x) and xsp¯ > 0, we have∑
p∈P
δsp`
mc
p (x) =
∑
p∈P+
δsp`
mc
p (x) +
∑
p∈P−
δsp`
mc
p (x)
≤
∑
p∈P+
δsp`
mc
p¯ (x) +
∑
p∈P−
δsp`p¯(x)
≤ `p¯(x)
(
γ
∑
p∈P+
δsp +
∑
p∈P−
δsp
)
= Λs(x)
(
γ
∑
p∈P+
δsp −
∑
p∈P+
δsp
)
≤ Λs(x)rs(γ − 1). (23)
Furthermore, note that by the definition of altruistic traffic at heterogeneous
Nash flow, if δap > 0 and δ
a
q > 0 (respectively, δ
a
q < 0) for any paths p, q, it holds
that `mcp (x) = `
mc
q (x) (respectively, `
mc
p (x) ≤ `mcq (x)) so that
∑
p∈P δ
a
p`
mc
p (x) ≤ 0.
Thus, continuing from (22) and applying (23), we have
L(x) ≤ L(x¯) + rs(γ − 1)Λs(x)
≤ L(x¯) + rs(γ − 1)Λs(x¯), (24)
where (24) follows from Lemma 4. Writing L(x¯) = (ra + rs)Λs(x¯), we thus have
that
L(x) ≤ (ra + rs)Λs(x¯) + rs(γ − 1)Λs(x¯)
=
ra + rsγ
ra + rs
L(x¯), (25)
completing the proof of Lemma 1. uunionsq
The proof of Lemma 2 proceeds similarly; here, we show that the total cost
experienced by altruistic traffic in any Nash flow is upper bounded by a simple
function of γ; we then use this fact to complete the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. We first derive the following simple upper bound on the cost
experienced by altruistic traffic in x. In the following, let path p¯ be such that
x¯ap¯ > 0, i.e., any path used by altruistic traffic in x¯.∑
p
xap`p(x) ≤
∑
p
xap`
mc
p (x)
=
∑
p
xap`
mc
p (x)
≤ `mcp¯ (x)
∑
p
xap
≤ raγ`p¯(x)
≤ raγΛs(x¯). (26)
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With (26) in hand, we are ready to compute the bound:
L(x) =
∑
p
xsp`p(x) +
∑
p
xap`p(x)
≤ rsΛs(x¯) + raγΛs(x¯) (27)
=
rs + raγ
rs + ra
L(x¯). (28)
Inequality (27) follows from Lemma 4 and (26), and (28) follows from the fact
that x¯ is an all-selfish Nash flow, and thus all traffic experiences the common
latency Λs(x¯). uunionsq
We end with a proof of Lemma 3, giving a family of example networks whose
Nash flow total latencies achieve the bound given in Lemmas 1 and 2 for all
admissible γ and rs. Interestingly, a single network topology consisting of only
3 links suffices to prove the matching lower bound, indicating that the perver-
sity index (much like the price of anarchy) has a degree of independence from
network topology [18].
Proof of Lemma 3. Let rs ∈ [0, 1] (so that ra = 1− rs) and let γ ≥ 1. Consider
the following nonatomic congestion game, also depicted generally in Figure 2.
This game occurs on a parallel network of 3 edges, so we shall refer to edges
as paths, write the path set P = {1, 2, 3}, and write the latency of path i as
`i(xi). Let altruists have access only to paths 1 and 2, and selfish traffic have
access to all paths, or Pa = {1, 2} and Ps = P. Let r := max{rs, ra}, so
that 1 − r ≤ min{rs, ra}. Let latency function ¯` be chosen3 such that ¯`(r) = 1
and ¯`mc(r) = γ. The path latency functions are selected to be `1(x1) = γ,
`2(x2) = ¯`(x2), and `3(x3) = 1 as depicted in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Network used to generate matching lower bound in Lemma 3.
First, we claim that the flow x := (1− r, r, 0) with xa1 = 1− r is a Nash flow
on this instance. To see this, first note that this flow is feasible, since 1− r ≤ ra
3 Note that this is always possible subject to mild conditions on the considered class
of latency functions; specifically, we require that `(x) implies the existence of α`(x)
and `(αx) for all α > 0.
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by the definition of r (see above), and by the fact that selfish traffic has access
to all paths. Next, by our choice of ¯`, the altruistic traffic incentive condition is
satisfied:
`mc1 (1− r) = γ ≤ ¯`mc(r) = `mc2 (r).
Again by the choice of ¯`, the selfish traffic incentive condition between paths 2
and 3 is satisfied:
`2(r) = ¯`(r) ≤ 1 = `3(0).
Finally, note that with this choice of latency functions, for all x′2 ≤ r, selfish
traffic never uses path 1 in any Nash flow, since `1(x1) = γ > 1 ≥ `2(x′2).
Straightforward computation shows that
L(x) = (1− r)γ + r =
{
rsγ + (1− rs) if rs ≤ 1/2
(1− rs)γ + rs if rs > 1/2. (29)
Having computed the total latency of a heterogeneous Nash flow, we turn
now to the computation of a corresponding homogeneous selfish Nash flow. We
claim that x¯ = (0, r, 1 − r) is a homogeneous selfish Nash flow. As before, x¯ is
feasible because 1− r ≤ rs. Since ¯`(r) = 1, all of the selfish traffic is indifferent
between paths 2 and 3, and strictly prefers them to path 1. All traffic experiences
a latency of 1, so L(x¯) = 1, so the desired lower bound is given directly by (29).
uunionsq
5 Conclusions
We have shown the first tight bounds on the perversity index for heterogeneous
altruistic populations for series-parallel networks. Future work will focus on ex-
tending these bounds to populations with diverse altruism levels, and exploring
how these arguments can be extended and generalized to arbitrary cost function
biases.
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